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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper utilizes the theoretical framework of Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008: 381) to 
investigate the performance implications of three strategic adaptation approaches 
(exploitation, exploration, and organizational ambidexterity) in 94 small firms supplying 
tools and materials to the U.S. - based furniture industry.  We measured four 
organizational antecedents to strategic adaptation as well as the performance outcomes 
associated with adaptation choice.  Results demonstrate that organizational deftness, group 
potency, elements of communication and cooperation within the firm, and low 
centralization were significantly related to organizational ambidexterity, and that 
ambidexterity was positively related to revenue and profit growth. The implications focus 
on steps that organizational leaders can take to improve the ambidextrous posture of their 
organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The problems confronting small firms 
facing an irreversible rise of low-cost, high-
quality global products and services are 
stark (Burpitt & Fowler, 2007; Liao, 
Welsch & Stoica, 2008).  This increasingly 
dynamic and competitive global 
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environment has been described as global 
competition’s “perfect storm” (Rousseau & 
Batt, 2007: 16).  Some firms facing this 
competitive storm will choose to stick with 
their existing business and focus on 
improving efficiencies (Ebben & Johnson, 
2005).  Others will explore new domains 
and focus on the development of new 
products, new services and new markets 
(Ebben & Johnson, 2005).  Managers in this 
situation commonly frame their strategic 
dilemma as a choice between two 
alternatives, to exploit old certainties or 
explore new possibilities (Gupta, Smith & 
Shalley, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993; 
March, 1991; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Wang & Li, 2008).  Unfortunately, reducing 
the options to a choice between these two 
strategic alternatives obscures the more 
difficult challenge confronting such firms.  
For immediate survival, and for long term 
health, organizations must balance the need 
to do both – that is, they should be 
ambidextrous (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Levinthal & March, 1993; Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996).  While the advantages that should 
theoretically accrue to the ambidextrous 
firm appear straightforward, there has been 
remarkably little empirical research 
exploring the construct (He & Wong, 2004; 
Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008), and none to 
date that focuses on SMEs. 
This research investigates the emergent 
strategies of SMEs facing industry decline, 
including the antecedents to strategy choice 
and the consequences of those choices.  
Specifically, we measured four 
organizational antecedents to strategic 
adaptation (one structural, two contextual, 
and one leadership-based antecedent), three 
possible strategic adaptation approaches 
(exploitation, exploration, and 
organizational ambidexterity), and the 
performance outcomes associated with 
adaptation choice in 94 SMEs supplying 
tools and materials to the U.S.- based 
furniture industry.  The timeframe of this 
research corresponds to a period of decline 
within the industry as many U.S. - based 
furniture manufacturers either closed, 
retrenched significantly, or transferred 
operations to off-shore locations (Burpitt & 
Fowler, 2007).  This dramatic and difficult 
period of environmental dynamism and 
competitive dynamics forced the small 
firms that had staked their businesses on 
supplying the large furniture makers to re-
evaluate their products, markets, and 
ultimately, their approach to strategy 
formulation and implementation.  The 
findings provide practical advice for SME 
leaders as they consider the nature and 
development of the necessary 
organizational resources for success in a 
changing world. 
Strategic Adaptation and SMEs 
Michael Porter’s (1980) theory of generic 
competitive strategy has been recognized as 
the dominant paradigm in strategy research 
and practice for three decades.  However, 
some research suggests that cost leadership 
and differentiation act as nothing more than 
high-level discriminators of competitive 
strategy designs (Campbell-Hunt, 2000), 
and contribute only tangentially to what has 
become the challenge of achieving a 
temporary competitive advantage (D’Aveni, 
Dagnino & Smith, 2010).  There is also a 
stream of research within the 
entrepreneurship/small business literature 
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which suggests that Porter’s generic designs 
do not apply well to SMEs (Lee, Lim, & 
Tan, 1999), do not predict significant 
differences in performance in SMEs 
(Rubach, Cangelosi, Bradley & McGee, 
2002), and do not adequately describe the 
strategy formulation and implementation 
processes in small firms (Ebben & Johnson, 
2005). 
An alternative perspective on strategy 
formulation and implementation is that 
offered by Ebben and Johnson (2005), who 
suggest two ideal forms (“efficiency” and 
“flexibility”) to better capture the range of 
strategy choices available within SMEs.  
Along these same lines, Droege and Dong 
(2008) suggest that entrepreneurial firms 
enact either an imitation (efficiency) or 
substitution through innovation (flexibility) 
strategy, and this theme mirrors the broader 
work of March (1991), Benner and 
Tushman (2003), and others with regard to 
exploitation and exploration. These two 
fundamentally different classes or 
categories of activities require different 
managerial attention, organizational 
configurations and organizational resources.  
The assumption of the efficiency versus 
flexibility thesis is that the appropriate 
match between strategy and environment 
leads to success, and those relationships 
have proven robust over the course of much 
empirical research (Ketchen et al., 1997). 
The question one might ask, then, is “what 
happens if the environment changes?”  This 
insight into managerial cognition provides 
us with a better understanding of firm 
behavior and performance in the face of 
changing conditions.  The concern here is 
that strategy per se matters less than 
strategic adaptation, or the response of a 
firm to changes in its competitive 
environment. It matters not what strategy a 
firm has, but which strategy is appropriate 
to the situation.  A persistent theme in much 
of the strategy literature is that firms 
achieve success only when they learn to 
balance continuity (exploitation) and 
change (exploration).  In this way, they may 
enact efficiency/imitation/exploitation or 
flexibility/substitution/exploration strategies 
when the competitive environment warrants 
such a strategic shift (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008).  This balance has been referred to as 
ambidexterity (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
Balancing Exploration and Exploitation 
We take the view, consistent with March 
(1991), Gupta, Smith and Shalley (2006), 
and others (cf., Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008) 
that exploration and exploitation involve 
varying degrees of organizational learning.  
Exploration involves “experimentation with 
new alternatives” (March, 1991: 85), thus 
increasing variance and generating internal 
variety (Beckman, 2006).  Exploration 
involves radical innovation, creating new 
markets and products, experimentation, 
broad search, frequent change and 
discovery (Beckman, 2006, Katila & Ahuja, 
2002; Miner, Bassoff & Moorman, 2001; 
Rosenkipf & Nerkar, 2001).  March (1991) 
considered “the refinement and extension of 
existing competencies, technologies and 
paradigms” the essence of exploitation 
(1991: 85).  Beckman (2006) and Benner 
and Tushman (2003) suggest that 
exploitation involves variance decreasing 
activities involving incremental innovation, 
implementation, refinement, routinization, 
local search, and efficiency.    
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Many will choose the more cautious of the 
two and for reasons that are explicable, 
reflecting habits and cognitions deeply 
ingrained in organizational forms and 
customs (March, 1991; Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986).  Faced with discontinuous change 
arising from outside the firm, many firms 
may be unable to initiate the fundamental 
departure from traditional practices that is 
often called for (Gilbert, 2005; Christensen 
& Bower, 1996; Wang & Li, 2008). This 
may be because managers did not recognize 
the need for change until it was too late 
(Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989) or, if aware, 
lacked the capabilities needed to “integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 
1106) that are needed to pursue new 
markets and new products with a new suite 
of capabilities.  The effort required for such 
a transformation is arduous, path dependent, 
and freighted down by existing resource 
endowments (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) 
and the sticky nature of organizational 
capabilities (Helfat, 2003).  
A balanced approach to exploration and 
exploitation, by contrast, is the essence of 
the ambidexterity hypothesis (Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1996), something that March 
(1991) considered essential to 
organizational survival.  While there are 
tensions associated with the competing use 
of resources (for exploration or 
exploitation), He and Wong (2004) suggest 
that the strategic logic of keeping both 
processes in play was unassailable. If firms 
are to “outrun” (He & Wong, 2004: 483) 
environmental selection pressures, they 
must maintain their capabilities to compete 
in mature markets (where cost and 
efficiency are critical) while simultaneously 
developing their capabilities to create new 
products and markets (where innovation 
and flexibility are critical). On this 
imperative, there is near perfect consensus 
(Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006). 
Given this discussion, one would expect the 
relationship between strategic adaptation 
and firm performance to be in favor of a 
balanced approach (ambidexterity), such 
that firms which simultaneously engage in 
variance-reducing (exploitation) and 
variance-inducing (exploration) activities 
would experience better performance.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
offered: 
H1:  Firms that engage in an implicit 
ambidextrous strategy experience greater 
performance than firms with an 
exploitation or exploration strategy. 
Organizational Antecedents to 
Adaptation Strategy 
Even though ambidexterity is believed to 
bestow substantial benefits on the firm, 
March (1991) believed that enacting 
exploration and exploitation simultaneously 
in an organization led to a zero-sum game 
wherein both approaches compete for scarce 
organizational resources.  Alternately, 
Gupta, Smith and Shalley (2006) suggest 
that not all types of “resources” in 
organizations need be finite.  Shapiro and 
Varian (1998), for instance, suggest that 
information and knowledge can be 
considered boundless, and Powell, Koput 
and Smith-Doerr (1996) suggest that 
external resources are available to many 
firms as a result of strategic and business 
alliances.  Therefore, depending on the 
premise you start with, the debate can be 
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summarized as a choice between viewing 
exploration and exploitation as two ends of 
a continuum (e.g., Katila & Ahuja, 2002; 
March, 1991), or as orthogonal variables 
(e.g., Beckman, Haunschild & Philips 
2004).  If your perspective is the former, the 
appropriate empirical test for the beneficial 
effects of balance would be an inverted U-
shaped relationship between degree of 
exploration/exploitation and performance.  
If the latter, then the proper test of the 
relationship between strategy and firm 
performance would be a test of the 
interaction of the two approaches.  Given 
the fact that our study context is firms in a 
declining industry, subject to scarce and 
declining resources, we take the view that 
exploration and exploitation are two ends of 
the same continuum (Wang & Li, 2008).  
This view is consistent with behavioral 
theory (Cyert & March, 1963) which 
suggests that risky and less risky options are 
equally appropriate for a firm with scarce 
resources.  Such a resource-based view of 
the firm leads us to believe that some firms 
possess specific internal resources to enact 
an ambidextrous strategy with regard to 
innovation, and some do not.  Therefore, it 
may be worth exploring the firm-specific 
antecedents which predict the choice of 
adaptation strategy within firms in a 
declining industry. 
  A number of researchers have suggested 
factors affecting adaptation strategy choice, 
including the availability of tacit knowledge 
(Ahuja, 2000; Miller, Zhao and Clantone, 
2006; Powell, Kiput and Smith-Doerr, 
1996), the ability of individuals and teams 
to apply that knowledge (Taylor & Greve, 
2006), founding team composition 
(Beckman, 2006), status differentiation in 
teams (Perrretti & Negro, 2006), and 
absorptive capacity and organizational 
inertia (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006).  
However, Beckman (2006) suggests that an 
even more important antecedent to 
exploration or exploitation exists:  
organizational leaders who create the 
conditions, via supportive structures and 
organizational contexts, for adaptive 
strategy.  In a further refinement, Raisch 
and Birkinshaw (2008) suggest that 
elements of leadership, context and 
structure are the most important 
determinants of adaptation strategy.  
Therefore, we extend the literature to four 
possible antecedents that may enable a firm 
to manage the difficult balance of 
exploration and exploitation.  The proposed 
antecedents are organizational deftness 
(McGrath, 2001), group potency (Guzzo, 
Yost, Campbell & Shea, 1993), 
characteristics of cooperation and 
communication within the firm (Lester, 
Meglino & Korsgaard, 2002), and degree of 
centralization (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993).  
Organizational deftness is proposed as a 
leadership-based antecedent, group potency 
and the cooperation/communication 
capacity of the firm are proposed as 
contextual antecedents, and centralization is 
proposed as a structural antecedent (Raisch 
& Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Organizational Deftness. While team 
composition and tacit knowledge are 
important determinants of organizational 
performance (Perretti & Negro, 2006), it is 
often more important to determine how 
those elements combine to contribute to 
organizational functioning and success.  In 
an attempt to explain how individuals 
within an organization can act 
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independently and heedfully (Weick & 
Roberts, 1993) to produce sustained 
positive outcomes, McGrath (2001) and 
others describe this concept of the “group 
mind” as deftness.  Lubatkin et al. (2006) 
similarly refer to this cognitive and 
behavioral integration as the management 
team’s wholeness and unity of effort.  
Organizational deftness (McGrath, 2001; 
McGrath, MacMillan & Venkataraman, 
1995) then is the joint activity of 
organizational members to know what is 
required and to do it skillfully and 
purposefully.  Organizational members who 
possess deftness are able to consolidate 
information and resources and execute work 
in a reliable and successful fashion.  It 
follows that an organization that possesses 
deftness is able to execute both exploration 
and exploitation (ambidexterity) at the 
appropriate times, depending on situational 
contingencies.  Therefore, one would expect 
deftness to be related to ambidexterity.   
H2:  Greater levels of organizational 
deftness are positively related to an 
ambidextrous adaptive strategy. 
Group potency.   As organizations 
increasingly de-layer and use self-managed 
teams for a variety of organizational tasks, 
there is a corresponding need for managers 
to understand how to create and manage 
high performing work teams (Mathieu et al., 
2008).  Researchers have recently turned 
their attention to investigating antecedent 
factors which might help predict work team 
effectiveness (Lester, Meglino & 
Korsgaard, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2008).  A 
construct which has attracted attention in 
this field is group potency or the jointly 
held belief that the group can be effective 
(Guzzo & Shea, 1992; Guzzo et al., 1993; 
de Jong, de Ruyter & Wetzels, 2005).  
Proposed as a group level variable similar 
in nature to individual self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1982), group potency is the 
shared belief that the group can accomplish 
important tasks successfully (Guzzo et al., 
1993).  Lester, Meglino and Korsgaard 
(2002) found that group potency was 
associated with subsequent group 
satisfaction, group effort, and group 
performance.  Therefore, we posit a positive 
relationship between group potency and 
ambidexterity, such that management teams 
which possess group potency will be more 
likely to engage in the strategic adaptation 
necessary to explore or exploit their 
environments for success. 
H3:  Greater levels of group potency are 
positively related to an ambidextrous 
adaptive strategy. 
Cooperation and communication.  High 
performing work teams are distinguished by 
their ability to successfully engage in 
interactive communication and task-focused 
cooperation in order to achieve team goals 
(Campion, Medsker & Higgs, 1993; 
Mathieu et al., 2008).  Typically, high 
performing work teams have had time to 
develop processes of mutual support and 
communication, and the behavioral scripts 
needed to guide effective group interactions 
(Janz, Colquitt & Noe, 1997).  Kauffeld 
(2006)  and Mathieu et al. (2008) found that 
groups that were adept at communication 
were more competent overall and Lester, 
Meglino and Korsgaard (2002) found that 
the level of communication and cooperation 
exhibited by a group contributed positively 
to group functioning by improving the 
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conduct of task-related and maintenance-
related activities.  It would also seem that 
groups which are adept at communication 
and cooperation should be able to more 
easily master the complex processes of 
adaptation and adjustment necessary for 
exploration and exploitation.  Based on this 
discussion, the following hypothesis is 
offered: 
H4:  Greater levels of management 
communication and cooperation are 
positively related to an ambidextrous 
adaptive strategy. 
Centralization.  Centralization is the 
degree to which decision making power and 
control are concentrated among a top 
management group in a firm.  Intuitively, it 
would seem that an organization 
characterized by a high degree of 
centralization would be limited in its ability 
to adapt its strategic orientation, and that the 
spatial separation of units would be more 
conducive to engaging in simultaneous 
exploration and exploitation (Raisch & 
Birkinshaw, 2008).  Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) found that certain characteristics of 
organizational structure, including high 
centralization, acted as barriers to strategic 
adaptation.  Conversely, an organic 
organization with low centralization would 
seem to possess the organizational dexterity 
needed to shift resources effectively 
between exploitation and exploration.  
Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) noted that 
strategic integration across units could be 
more easily accomplished by coordination 
at the senior management level and via a 
strong, widely shared corporate culture.  
Thus, sub-units and processes devoted to 
different learning orientations (exploration 
or exploitation) could indeed exist in a 
decentralized organization, as long as 
simultaneous processes of integration 
existed to coordinate outcomes.    
H5:  Greater levels of centralization are 
negatively related to an ambidextrous 
adaptive strategy. 
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample.  The firms sampled in 
this study provide supplies, tools, services 
and materials to the furniture industry, 
including such products and services as 
plastic injected parts, textile dying and 
finishing, wooden furniture parts, foam 
rubber products, and a wide variety of tools 
and materials used in furniture 
manufacturing.  The benefit of a single 
industry focus is noted by researchers 
(Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999; Miller, 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1997) who point out 
that working with a single industry sample 
can help control for common factor markets 
and inter-industry variance (Barney, 1986; 
Gordon, 1991; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 
1989).  The subjects were selected from a 
manufacturing directory listing firms, 
products, years of operation, annual sales 
ranges, and number of employees.  
Selection was based on two criteria.  To 
ensure that the firm’s responses to industry 
change were made at the level of the target 
firm only, stand-alone firms were chosen.  
Subsidiaries or divisions of larger firms 
were excluded.  Second, only firms that had 
been in operation a minimum of seven years 
were included.  
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One hundred forty-eight firms met these 
criteria.  Phone contact was made with one 
hundred thirty-six firms on the list.  Twelve 
firms had closed or been absorbed into 
another firm since publication of the firm 
directory.  Of the one hundred thirty-six 
who were contacted, one hundred seventeen 
agreed to participate.  Two sets of surveys 
were distributed in each firm.  Firm owners 
completed questionnaire items measuring 
changes in revenue and profit and their 
firm’s primary strategic emphasis 
(exploitation, exploration, or ambidextrous).  
Members of the firms’ management teams 
completed questionnaires measuring 
organizational deftness, communications, 
potency and centralization.  An average of 
three members of the management team per 
firm completed the surveys.  Completed 
surveys were returned from ninety-four 
firms.  Participating firms averaged 29 
employees each and had been in operation a 
minimum of 10 years.  All firm owners and 
201 of the 255 managers were male and 
averaged slightly more than 15 years 
experience in their respective industries.  
These firms averaged $7 million in annual 
sales.   
Strategic Orientation.  The classification 
of the firms as primarily exploratory, 
exploitative or ambidextrous was 
accomplished by comparison of the 
responses of the firms’ owners to an eight 
item scale developed by He and Wong 
(2004).  This scale, shown in Table 1, 
includes four items that describe an 
exploratory strategy and four that describe 
an exploitation strategy.   
 
 
Table 1-Objectives For Undertaking Product or Process Related Initiatives in the Last 
Three Years (He & Wong, 2004). 
Exploratory Emphasis          Exploitation Emphasis 
Introduce new generation of products            Improve existing product quality 
Extend product range              Improve production flexibility 
Open new markets              Reduce production cost 
Enter new technology fields             Improve yield or reduce material or time  
    
The firm owners were asked to rate the 
relative importance of each item using a 5-
point Likert scale, where 1 = of no 
importance to firm, 2 = of limited 
importance to firm, 3 = of some importance 
to firm, 4 = of considerable importance to 
firm, and 5 = of great importance to firm.  
Their responses to each set of four were 
averaged to create an “exploratory” score  
and an “exploitation” score for each firm.  
A firm was categorized as exploitive if its 
score on the exploitative scale was higher 
than 4.0 and its score on the exploratory 
scale was 2.0 or less.  In reverse of this, a 
firm was characterized as exploratory if its 
score on the exploratory scale was higher 
than 4.0 and its score on the exploitative 
scale was 2.0 or less.  Limiting inclusion in 
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either the exploratory or exploitative 
category to firms whose scores were at the 
extreme ends of the 5-point Likert scale (4 
or 5) was done to make it more likely that 
the resultant grouping would delineate firms 
with a clear, unambiguous emphasis on one 
or the other strategy.  A firm was 
characterized as ambidextrous if its score on 
both the exploratory and exploitative scale 
averaged 3.0 or higher.  This categorization 
follows He and Wong (2004) who note that 
a firm can be defined as ambidextrous if it 
scores high on both exploratory and 
exploitative strategies or if it has relatively 
equal emphasis on both.  Applying these 
requirements resulted in 39 firms defined as 
exploitative, 31 as exploratory, and 24 as 
ambidextrous for a total of 94 firms. 
Performance Measures.  The owners were 
also asked to provide information on any 
changes in revenue and profit over the 
preceding three year period.  Revenue and 
profit change was measured by having 
owners select one of five statements that 
best described any changes in revenue and 
profit within their firms.  The responses 
were scored as such:  decline greater than 
10 percent = 1, decline up to 10 percent = 2, 
no appreciable change = 3, increase up to 
10 percent = 4, and increase greater than 10 
percent = 5.  Measures of the firms’ 
financial performance and the firms’ 
strategy were taken from the firms’ owners 
as these individuals would have the most 
accurate information.  
Deftness, Potency, 
Communication/Cooperation, and 
Centralization.  Organizational deftness 
within the firm was measured with a 19-
item scale developed by McGrath, 
MacMillan & Venkataraman (1995).  
Managers within each firm were asked to 
indicate their perception of their firm’s 
position on each of the 19 statements on a 
5-point scale between two semantic 
differentials.  A score of 1 would indicate 
lack of deftness while 5 would indicate 
maximum deftness.  Organizational potency 
was measured using an 8-item scale 
developed by Guzzo, Yost, Campbell and 
Shea (1993).  Respondents selected a 
number from 1 to 5 that indicated their 
agreement with each of the 8 items on the 
potency scale, where 1 = no agreement 
whatsoever and 5 = complete agreement.  
Communication and cooperation within the 
firms was measured using an 8-item scale 
developed by Lester, Meglina and 
Korsgaard (2002).  As with potency, 
subjects indicated the extent of their 
agreement with each of the 8 items by 
selecting a number from 1 to 5.  Finally, the 
degree of organizational centralization was 
measured using a 5-item scale developed by 
Jaworski and Kohli (1993).  Here again 
subjects indicated the extent of their 
agreement with each of the 5 items by 
selecting a number from 1 to 5.  Measures 
of deftness, potency, communication and 
cooperation, and centralization were 
provided by the managers within each firm, 
for a total of 272 responses from 94 firms 
with an average of 3 responses per firm.  
Centralization was reverse coded.  The 
scores of the managers from each firm were 
averaged to produce an organizational level 
mean score.  The averaging of individual 
scores to derive a firm level score is a 
commonly used methodology (Gibson, 
Randel, & Earley, 2000; Earley, 1993).  The 
firms’ owners did not provide an 
assessment of these four constructs.  This 
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was done to minimize the likelihood of 
common method variance, which can occur 
when the same subjects assess both 
dependent and independent variables. 
Results 
The results of our analysis are provided in 
Tables 2 and 3.  ANOVA results provided 
in Table 2 suggest that ambidextrous firms 
experienced more growth in revenue and 
profit over the three years leading up to the 
study than would exploitative or 
exploratory firms.  This finding supports 
hypothesis 1.
 
Table 2-Anova: Revenue and Profit 
Variable   Group    N   Mean    s.d.       F    Sig. 
Exploitative Firms   39    2.61   .67  10.154  .000 
Exploratory Firms   31    2.87   .72   
Ambidextrous Firms   24    3.51   .93   
 
Revenue 
 
 
 
Total Firms   94    2.92   .83   
Exploitative Firms   39    2.38   .63  13.518  .000 
Exploratory Firms   31    2.29   .74   
Ambidextrous Firms   24    3.21   .78   
 
Profit 
 
 
 
Total Firms   94    2.56   .80   
                      
ANOVA results provided in Table 3 also 
reveal that measures of the four antecedent 
variables (deftness, potency, 
communication and cooperation, and 
centralization) are higher (lower for 
centralization, which was reverse scored) in 
ambidextrous firms than in either 
exploitative or exploratory firms.  Again, 
these data support our hypotheses.    
Discussion and Implications for SMEs 
This research sought to extend and support 
the model developed by Raisch and 
Birkinshaw (2008) by analyzing four 
organizational antecedents to learning 
orientation/ adaptation strategy selection 
and subsequent effects on firm 
performance.  Consistent with that model, 
we found that leadership-based, contextual, 
and structural antecedents were associated 
with the selection of an ambidextrous 
adaptation strategy.  Specifically, we found 
that organizational deftness, or the unity of 
effort embodied in the concept of a “group 
mind” is a powerful determinant of the 
organization’s learning orientation. 
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Additionally, management teams which 
possess potency, or the shared belief that 
they can achieve great things, suggests that 
group attitudes toward the simultaneous 
pursuit of exploration and exploitation are 
important prerequisites to adaptation and, 
ultimately, performance.  Another 
organizational contextual variable that is 
related to learning orientation is the degree 
of communication and cooperation in the 
organization. 
 
Table 3-Strategy and Organizational Antecedents 
Variable Group     N   Mean s.d. F Sig. 
Exploitative Firms    39    2.90 .25  58.92  .000 
Exploratory Firms    31    3.02 .36   
Ambidextrous Firms    24    3.81 .24   
 
Deftness 
 
 
 Total Firms    94    3.17 .47   
Exploitative Firms    39    2.54 .31 123.76  .000 
Exploratory Firms    31    3.02 .33   
Ambidextrous Firms    24    3.85 .18   
 
Potency 
 
 
 Total Firms    94    3.03 .59   
Exploitative Firms    39    3.32 .45    6.60  .000 
Exploratory Firms    31    3.42 .51   
Ambidextrous Firms    24    3.74 .37   
 
Communication  
and Commitment 
 
 
 
Total Firms    94    3.46 .47   
Exploitative Firms    39    2.63 .39  66.08  .000 
Exploratory Firms    31    2.95 .37   
Ambidextrous Firms    24    3.79 .42   
 
Centralization 
 
 
 Total Firms    94    3.03 .61   
 
One might argue that while deftness and 
potency represent the potential to succeed 
with an ambidextrous learning orientation, 
elements of communication and cooperation 
represent the degree to which organizational 
interaction and interdependence are 
manifestly enacted in pursuit of this 
difficult strategy.  Finally, while the spatial 
separation of sub-units (decentralization) is 
believed to contribute to the development of 
the exploratory and exploitative processes 
essential to survival and prosperity, 
consistent with Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004), structural forces alone may be 
inadequate to the task.  It is perhaps worth 
exploring the interactive nature of the 
antecedents (cf. Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008) to determine subsequent effects. 
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How might small business practitioners 
interpret and act upon the results?  From a 
larger perspective, this research mirrors the 
findings of O’Regan, Ghobadian, and Sims 
(2005) which suggests that when firm 
leadership style matches firm strategy, the 
result is higher firm performance.  And 
more directly, O’Regan et al. (2005) found 
that a balanced transformational and 
transactional leadership style is likely to 
lead to higher performance in all situations.   
In other words, when exploitation is called 
for, a transactional approach to leadership is 
most appropriate.  When exploration is 
called for, a transformational approach to 
leadership is most appropriate.  And when 
the organization needs to be ambidextrous, 
a balance of styles is preferred. 
In this study, we found that leaders who 
create the conditions necessary for 
organizational deftness (McGrath, 2001; 
McGrath, MacMillan & Venkataraman, 
1995) develop within their organizations 
members who know what is required and 
know how to do it skillfully and 
purposefully.  Organizational members who 
possess deftness are able to consolidate 
information and resources to exploit 
organizational efficiencies and work in a 
reliable and successful fashion.  They are 
also able to simultaneously explore and 
innovate because they possess a “group 
mind” (McGrath, 2001) and can more easily 
see a wider range possibilities in any given 
situation.  The development of deftness may 
occur over time as management teams work 
together on common (and uncommon) 
problems.  It is worth noting that the 
managers in this study had been with each 
other for an average of 15 years.  In 
addition to time, deftness may be the result 
of the development of trust between the 
leader and the management team.  Heedful 
interactions can only occur if each member 
of a system trusts the inputs of the other 
members of a system (Weick & Roberts, 
1993).  Managers would be well advised to 
give management teams the time and space 
necessary to develop heedful interactions. 
Leaders also shape the context in which 
organizational activities are conducted.  The 
jointly held belief that the group can be 
effective, or group potency (Guzzo & Shea, 
1992; Guzzo et al., 1993; de Jong, de 
Ruyter & Wetzels, 2005), is a powerful 
predictor of subsequent success.  Leaders 
can build group potency by acknowledging 
and supporting group performance and 
celebrating group successes.  
Knowledgeable leaders know to start with 
small group tasks and build upon each 
success until the management team is 
capable of tackling increasingly challenging 
and important organizational activities.  
Attention must be paid to group and team 
development, and policies aimed at 
increasing functional communication and 
cooperation are essential.  Systems, tools, 
and processes should be developed to 
support and speed decision making in 
turbulent environments, and those tools 
should also free individuals for more 
important duties when exploiting known 
efficiencies.  Finally, good leaders know 
when to “let go” – trust is developed when 
decisions are decentralized, and the wisdom 
of teams can only flourish when given the 
room to explore.  The myth of the heroic 
leader dies a slow death, but the data clearly 
indicate that a controlling style of 
leadership only works in an efficiency-
oriented environment. 
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The strengths of this research are that it 
investigated similar firms competing in a 
very dynamic competitive environment, it 
used multiple measures of organizational 
antecedents to adaptive strategy choice, and 
that it extended and supported the 
theoretical model proposed by Raisch and 
Birkinshaw (2008).  Consistent with 
Lubatkin et al. (2006), we believe that the 
leadership-based antecedents are important 
determinants of organizational learning 
orientations, and that particularly for small 
firms such as those investigated in this 
study, leadership and top management team 
deftness, potency and communication are 
essential to enacting an ambidextrous 
strategy.  We also found indirect support for 
the notion, developed and supported by 
Jansen, van den Bosch and Volberda 
(2005a), that firms competing in highly 
dynamic and competitive environments are 
more likely to pursue an ambidextrous 
learning orientation.  The principle 
limitation of this research is that the 
relationships presented represent data from 
a one-time collection and therefore 
longitudinal assessments of firm 
performance are not included.   It may be 
the case that all firms gravitate toward an 
ambidextrous strategy over time out of 
necessity, and that firms who fail to make 
the transition, especially in highly dynamic 
environments, cease to exist.  It should be 
noted that the study is limited to a single 
industry which may limit one's ability to 
generalize.  Finally, these results may be 
applicable to or informative for practitioners 
in declining industries, but not necessarily 
relevant to all small firms (i.e. those in 
mature or growth industries).   
The results of this research add weight to 
the emerging consensus that firms can 
successfully react to environmental 
dynamism and competitive dynamics by 
engaging in simultaneous processes of 
exploration and exploitation.  The need to 
do so is becoming more of an imperative 
every day, yet the organizational resources 
necessary to enact such a strategy may be 
limited, especially for small firms.  
Organizational deftness and group potency 
seem to be firm-specific human capital that 
vary widely between organizations, and 
appear to be the result of value-based 
leadership and organizational cultures that 
support individual growth and team 
learning.  Of additional interest is the 
leadership climate within these firms where, 
presumably, a strong and principled leader 
sufficiently empowers organizational sub-
units to explore and exploit, to learn and 
progress, with sufficiently decentralized 
processes for doing so and sufficiently 
integrated mechanisms for communicating 
and coordinating the work to produce 
superior results. 
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